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Abstract
The present paper documents that political stability is positively
associated with the extent of domestic trade. In explaining this reg-
ularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the
emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market ex-
change, the welfare of inherently selsh individuals will be mutually
independent. As a result, political negotiations, echoing the prefer-
ences of the citizens of society, will be dog-eat-dog in nature. Whoever
has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that en-
hance the productivity of his supporters at the expense of other groups
in society. If the gains from specialization become su¢ ciently large,
however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non-
cooperative under self-su¢ ciency, the political decision making process
becomes cooperative in the market economy, as the welfare of individ-
uals will be mutually interdependent due to the exchange of goods.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that richer economies tend to be more politically stable
than their less a­ uent counterparts. Indeed, almost every indicator of po-
litical turmoil, ranging from political protests against policies enacted by
the current regime to the dramatic case of revolutions, exhibits a negative
correlation with prosperity. This fact is often explained by e.g. the degree of
fractionalization of society (measured in terms of income inequality, ethnic-
ity, language or perhaps religious beliefs), and is suggested as one important
reason for the dismal growth performance of Africa in particular (Easterly
and Levine, 1997). However, a relative lack of political stability is not unique
to modern day poor nations. Indeed, we argue below that a link between
prosperity and political stability can also be found in the historical record
of todays industrialized societies.
The present paper aims to provide a theory which is capable of shed-
ding light on both the historical patterns and the observed cross-country
correlation between political stability and prosperity, a regularity we will
refer to as "capitalist cohesion. The fundamental hypothesis is that the
nature of the political struggle between groups is critically a¤ected by the
organization of the economy. The organizational institution which is argued
to be paramount is the market institution itself. That is, whether or not
(the members of) rival political groups are engaged in trade with each other
or not. The central idea is that market integration will tend be associated
with a more cohesive political interaction between rival groups in society,
reducing the incidence of political uheavals. The logic of the argument is as
follows.
Consider a regime one may label self-su¢ ciency. In this regime indi-
viduals are economically fully self-reliant in the sense that they produce the
goods they consume themselves. This regime might be thought to approxi-
mate a predominantly subsistence-oriented economy. In the absence of mar-
kets where goods are exchanged the welfare of individuals will be mutually
independent. As a result, any redistributive struggle between individuals
will be erce; whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make
decisions that enhance the productivity of his supporters at the expense of
other groups in society.
Consider instead the polar opposite case: A fully developed market econ-
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omy. In the market environment rival political groups will be specialized in
production of di¤erent goods and trading with one another. In a historical
setting one may think of the political rivalry between merchants (and later
manufacturers) on the one hand, and the landed elite (or farmers) on the
other, as an example of how rival groups may be identied by the type of
good produced.1 The key insight is that it will no longer be unambigiously in
the interest of any political group to make decisions that enhance their own
productivity at the expense of other groups in society. The reason is that the
market institution produces a price tag on curbing the living standards and
productivity of selected groups; higher prices on the goods they are associ-
ated with the production of. As a result of market integration, an alignment
of interests emerges and the political process becomes more cohesive because
of it. Indeed, as demonstrated in the model below, the allocation outcome
from political interaction in a market scenario becomes more e¢ cient (in
the stylized model, Pareto optimal), and unanimously agreed upon. Hence,
insofar as a transition to a market economy occurs, political cohesion ensues,
making political instabilty and conict much less likely. In addition, output
per capita rises due to the gains from specialization and because of more
e¢ cient political outcomes.
However, a transition from self-su¢ ciencyto a market economy may
not occur. As illustrated in the model below, whether a transition occurs
or not depends, among other things, on the gains from specialization. If
just one group stands to gain only little from trading, yet is politically
powerful in autarky, it may not wish to participate in the market due
to its ability to appropriate resources through the political process. As a
result a transition is not viable. Consequently, the process of task-specic
skill formation, which drives comparative advantages in the model below, is
key in fascilitating the emergence of political cohesion at a deeper level. If
the scope for learning - within di¤erent tasks is su¢ ciently large the gains
from specialization will rise over time and sooner or later make a transition
likely. Still, during the delay the economy as a whole is caught in what is
e¤ectively a poverty trap.
As should be clear, this theory is broadly consistent with the contempo-
1 In contemporary Africa opposing political sides are often dened along ethnic lines.
In some cases di¤erent ethnic groups are in fact distinguishable by which goods they tend
to be associated with the production of. An example is presented in Easterly (2002, Ch.
13) involving the cocoa producing Ashantis in Ghana.
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rary cross-country correlation between income and political stability, pro-
vided that a lack of political cohesion is seen as the root of political instabil-
ity. The theory suggests, moreover, that causality runs in either direction.
On the one hand, economic progress enables a transition into a cohesive
political climate. On the other hand, more political cohesion leads to more
e¢ cient political outcomes, which spurs productivity. Aside from being con-
sistent with the correlations noted above, the theory also complements other
hypotheses on the causes of political instability.
Consider the hypothesis that ethnic divisions are key in understanding
political instability (e.g. Easterly and Levine, 1997; Annett, 2001). At the
fundamental level the notion that ethnicity matters for political instability,
and the present idea  that a lack of exchange in goods is the culprit 
are perfectly reconcilable. For example, lack of (willingness to) trade could
be grounded in ethnic hatred. Ethnically anchored political disagreements
may therefore be perpetuated by a lack of economic interaction of individual
groups. At the same time, the two mechanismsmay be at work simulta-
neously, and independently of one another.
If political instability is a symptom of a lack of political cohesion, as we
maintain, the theory contributes with a further understanding of why poorer
economies tend to be more politically unstable, and why this state of a¤airs
may come at a cost of lower living standards. From this perspective the
present paper is related to the literature which directly examines the sources
of political instability (e.g. Olson, 1963, Alesina et al, 1996; Easterly and
Levine, 1997) or civil conict (Collier and Hoe­ er, 2004; Miguel et al., 2004;
Olsson, 2007). Similarly related is a string of contributions which provides
theory and evidence on the consequences of political instability for prosperity
or institutional change (e.g. Rodrik, 1993; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000;
Bates et al, 2004; Barro, 1991; Alesina et al., 1996).2
The paper is also related to a (primarily political science) literature
which explores the potential links between trade, democracy and inter-
state conict. The idea that free trade and democracy are associated with
2A major implication of the present paper is that cohesion arises gradually during devel-
opment. From this perspective the work of Galor et al (2005) and Galor and Moav (2006)
are related. In these works, however, consensus is utlimately generated due to capital-
skill complementarity which makes rival political groups interdependent (i.e. workers and
capitalists). The present paper contains a di¤erent consensus creating mechanism; the
market mechanism itself.
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peace on the international arena has a long history and goes back to Im-
manuel Kant, Adam Smith, Richard Cobden, among others. In political
science, a large contemporary literature has emerged that studies the phe-
nomenon often referred to as the liberal peace. That is, that democratic
and market-oriented countries usually do not ght with each other.3 How
this relationship comes about is an issue that political scientists still gripple
with. Mousseau (2003), for instance, proposes that countries where people
are engaged in contractual exchange of goods and services gradually tend
to develop liberal norms and values, which in turn strengthen the market
economy. On the basis of a statistical analysis of interstate wars 1950-92,
Gartzke (2007) even claims that the positive e¤ect of democracy on peace
disappears when a variable for nancial openness is included. According to
Gartzke (2007), we should therefore refer to the link between prosperity and
political cohesion as "the capitalist peace". Our paper adds to this literature
by modelling the process of how an internal market economy arises, which
is arguably a necessary requisite for subsequent international trade.4
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we present historical and
cross-country evidence on the relationship between political stability and
market orientation. In section 3, we outline the production and consumption
decisions of our two groups, whereas the political interaction between groups
is modelled in section 4. In section 5, we derive the conditions for choosing
one self-su¢ ciency or a market economy. Section 6 discusses the implications
of the model and section 7 concludes.
2 Evidence
The central hypothesis of the paper is that stability is promoted by the
exchange of goods rather than income per se. Since domestic trade is asso-
ciated with productivity grains from the division of labor, one would expect
a positive correlation between income and stability. In this section we exam-
ine historical evidence which suggest that increasing trade intensity ushered
the beginning of a more politically stable environment in Europe in general,
3For a literature overview and some new evidence, see Mousseau et al (2003).
4Skaperdas and Syranopoulos (2001) provides a formal statement of this idea. In their
analysis, trade between nations does not necessarily lead to peace. Furthermore, the
price of the traded good is assumed to be exogenous, whereas endogenous terms of trade
(between rival groups or regions) is a key part of our theory.
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and in the UK in particular. In addition, we make an attempt to link do-
mestic trade directly to political stability by way of cross-country regression
analysis.
2.1 Historical evidence
Consider England, the epicenter of the industrial revolution. As pointed out
by Clark (1996, p 568):Between 1560 and 1770, England experienced nu-
merous periods of political turmoil, internal warfare, and important changes
of political regime. Indeed, this period contains events such as the English
Civil War (1639-51), several planned coups and the glorious revolutionof
1688. In fact, most of mainland Europe was characterized by a similar state
of a¤airs during this period. De Vries (1976, p. 3) puts it succinctly:
 ... the seventeenth century is marked by an unusual num-
ber of civil disturbances: aristocratic protests against the growth
of the bureaucratic state and peasant revolts against new taxes,
changed land tenure conditions, and food distribution measures
that o¤ended a sense of economic justice.
When moving beyond the 17th century one continues to observe dis-
ruption on a fairly regular basis in England. 18th and early 19th century
England witnessed the Gordon Riots of 1780, the Luddith movement, the
1776 American Revolution, food riots and a considerable assortment of mi-
nor uprisings (Archer, 2000). Eventually, however, England did enter a
period of calmer political climate towards the end of the 19th century, and
continued on the path towards prosperity (Olson, 1963). But clearly the
historical record demonstrate that the political climate in England used to
be turbulent, with periods of political upheavals not unlike what is observed
in modern day less developed economies.
In the context of the historical record one may wonder whether a transi-
tion from self-su¢ ciencyto market tradecan be said to have bearing on
what occurred in Europe in general, and England in particular, during the
last millennium. To be sure, there is no historical period where autarky
can be said to be an exact description of how the economy was organized. At
least as far back as the Dark Ages archeological evidence of formal market
places can be marshaled (Hodges, 1982, Ch. 9), and during the Medieval pe-
riod historical evidence can be brought to bear on how markets in England
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expanded and contracted as a function of the time varying size of popula-
tion (Britnell, 1993). Still, there is no doubt the last millennium has seen a
remarkable expansion of the role of the market in peoples everyday life. As
Seabright (2004, p. 42) puts it:
Until around six hundred years ago in Europe, and until a
little more recently in North America, most families ate food they
had grown themselves. They were certainly not self-su¢ cient in
the strict sense since they relied on others for some things metal
for agricultural tools for example. But changes in their links with
the outside world would rarely threaten their food supply. Today,
in the same countries, most families who were prevented from
exchanging with others would starve within a few weeks.
From this perspective; if one thinks about the current organization of
the economy, where individuals to an extreme extend rely on each other (or
rather the market) for their survival, as a fully integrated market economy,
the simplication of describing the situation in Europe a millennium ago as
autarkymay seem less unreasonable as a (perhaps crude) approximation.5
Turning to the crux of the historical theoretical argument; a reasonable
case can be made that market participation and the exchange of goods did
accelerate in the centuries preceding the industrial revolution, thus paving
the way for a more cohesive political climate. The intensication of market
participation, associated with a gradual reduction in the degree to which
individuals were self-su¢ cient with regards to agricultural goods is what De
Vries (1994) labels the industrious revolution. In particular he remarks
that (p. 257):
.. the industrious revolution, for which evidence can be
found from the mid-seventeenth century into the early nineteenth,
consisted of two transformations: the reduction in leisure time
... and the allocation of labor from goods and services for direct
consumption to marketed goods.
5The notion of a clean switch from autarky to a full market economy is a similar
(over)simplication. Historically, the expansion of trade over increasing distances was
probably a gradual one (e.g. North, 1991). This gradual evolution covering periods of
partial specialization in the economy is not captured by the model. Providing a more
detailed description of the evolution of the market institution and its gradual e¤ects on
the nature of the political struggle is a topic for future research.
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Moreover, as for the other half of society the city dwellers Voth (1998)
provides evidence of a large increase in working hours between the eighteenth
and nineteenth century for Londoners. With less time to spare the urban
population would naturally have to become correspondingly more reliant on
(increasingly specialized) food producers in order to sustain themselves.6
Seen through the lenses of the theory advanced in the present paper; once
the industrious revolutionis complete, resulting in an intensied exchange
of goods, the political climate should start to become more cooperative in
nature, as it arguably did in England starting sometime in the last half of
the nineteenth century.
2.2 Cross-country evidence
2.2.1 Specication
In this section we attempt to gauge the importance of domestic market inte-
gration for the extent of political stability by way of cross section regression
analysis. The central hypothesis we wish to examine is whether exchange of
goods, rather than income per se, matters to stability. This implies that we
cannot use GDP per capita as our measure of choice for domestic market
integration; instead we will rely on other proxies.
Formally, we estimate an equation of the following form
Si = Ti +X
0
i + i; (1)
where Si is a measure of political stability, Ti is a proxy for domestic trade
intensity,Xi a vector of additional controls (which includes a constant term).
Finally, i captures noise and omitted variables. The parameter of central
concern is , which we estimate by ordinary least squares (OLS) and two
stage least squares (2SLS).
2.2.2 Data
In measuring political stability (POLSTAB) we rely on the well known mea-
sure developed by Kaufmann et al. (2006); POLSTAB is an average for the
period 1996-2005 and higher values of the index is associated with greater
6However, see Clark and Van der Werf (1998) for a sceptical assessment of the claim
that working hours expanded during this period.
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stability. Specically, Kaufmann et al (2006, p 4) dene it as capturing:
"Perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence
and terrorism."
In proxying domestic trade intensity we chiey rely on the ratio of nom-
inal money supply to nominal GDP. The logic of using this variable, for this
purpose, is as follows. By the quantity theory of moneyM v = P T , where
M is the nominal money supply, v is the velocity of money, P is the price
level and T the number of transactions. Accordingly, by the quantity theory
we may therefore write nominal money to nominal GDP as
M
PY
=
(1=v)  P  T
PY
=
T=v
Y
,
which gives the ratio of the number of times a unit of currency is transacted
(T=v) relative to real output. Hence, the more times a unit of output is
transacted, by way of monetary exchange, the larger the ratio. We expect
this be a sensible proxy for the intensity of domestic exchange of goods in
monetary economies, and we refer to the variable as transaction intensity
(TRANS). It is usually assumed that T and v are xed in the short run and
that they capture the structural behavior of consumers and rms. Nothing
precludes however that T=v varies in the long run. We expect to be able
to pick up this variation when comparing countries at di¤erent stages of
development. As should be clear, we expect TRANS to be positively cor-
related with POLSTAB. The source of the variable is World Development
Indicators (2005) (WDI), and it is measured in 1995.7
To stenghen the case for an association between domestic trade and
political stability, we invoke two additional proxies: external trade intensity,
and phonelines per 1000 inhabitants.
The use of external trade to proxy domestic trade is based on the idea
that countries with more external trade also tend to have well developed
domestic markets, featuring a high degree of exchange of goods (see Frankel
and Romer, 1999, p. 380). Accordingly, the contention is that greater exter-
nal trade signals greater domestic trade, and we therefore expect external
trade to be positively correlated with POLSTAB. Trade is more specically
7Technically,M is measured as M2, i.e. notes and coins in circulation plus highly liquid
bank deposits.
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measured as proposed by Alcalá and Ciccone (2004): REALTRADE. RE-
ALTRADE is given by total imports plus exports (measured in constant
dollars), divided by PPP GDP. It is measured in 1995, and we expect it
to be positively associated with POLSTAB. The data source is WDI. The
variable is measured in 1995, and derives from WDI.
We use the number of phonelines per 1000 inhabitants (COMM) to
capture transaction costs. In particular, we would expect that in the ab-
sence of an adequte acess to communication tools it will be harder to match
sellers and buyers, which works to lower the intensity of domestic trade. Ac-
cordingly, we expect COMM to be positively correlated with POLSTAB.8
Table 1 provides a correlation matrix between TRANS, COMM, REAL-
TRADE and POLSTAB, and Table 2 reports summary statistics for selected
variables
TABLE 1 & 2
Reassuringly, the three proxies for domestic trade intensity are mutu-
ally highly correlated, as seen from Table 1. Moreover, as an indication of
things to come one may note the sizeable correlation (consistent with priors)
between all of the three measures and POLSTAB.
Finally, when investigating the robustness of the partial correlation be-
tween our proxies of choice for domestic market integration, we also include
a set of controls (X) which have been argued to a¤ect the extent of political
stability in the existing literature (Olson, 1963; Alesina and Perotti, 1996;
Easterly and Levine, 1997; Annett, 2001). This list consists of the following
controls: Ethnic fractionalisation, GDP per capita, the growth rate of in-
come per capita, ores and metal exports (i.e. natural resources), a socialist
dummy, the urbanisation rate, primary schooling, government consumption,
land inequality and, nally, the poverty head count ratio (1 $ per day).9 In
addition, we include a full set of regional dummies. Some of these variables
are only available for a relatively small sample of countries, others are widely
available. In the OLS regressions the sample size therefore varies when we
8More generally, phonelines may proxy the extent of domestic infrastructure; roads,
airports, harbours, and so forth. All these types of infrastructure are likely to a¤ect
domestic trade in similar ways.
9A brief description of each variable (and motivation for its inclusion) is found in the
appendix.
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successively include the above mentioned controls one at the time; and when
we include them all at once.
In the context of 2SLS regressions, however, we instrument T , and con-
trol only for the plausibly exogenous determinants from the above list. That
is, ethnic fractionalisation and the regional dummies. This allows us to esti-
mate the impact from an exogenous change in T on POLSTAB using a data
set which includes more than 140 countries.
2.2.3 Results
Partial Correlations Table 3 shows the results from estimating equation
(1) by ordinary least squares. The approach taken consists of including a
proxy for domestic trade intensity along with ethnic fractionalization and
a full set of regional dummies. In addition we provide the results from
successively introducing likely covariates of POLSTAB into this baseline
specication. Finally, we also report the results from including (nearly)
all the determinants of POLSTAB at the same time. We provide detailed
results for T =TRANS, whereas we only report the results from the full
specication, in the case where T =REAL TRADE and COMM. This is
done in the interest of brevity. The detailed results are very similar, and
available upon request.
TABLE 3
Turning to the results reported in column 1-9 it is clear that TRANS
enters with the expected sign. In all cases it is signicant, albeit only at 10%
when the socialist dummy is introduced. This dummy takes on a value
of 1, if the country was ruled by a socialist regime during the period 1950-
95. At closer inspection the dummy and TRANS are highly and negatively
correlated. A possible interpretation is that a socialist government tend to
implement policies which are detrimental to market exchange.
In column 10 we include all of the controls simultaneously, except the
two measures of land inequality: GINI and landholdings.10 The reason why
we omit the latter is that including them reduces our sample to a mere
10These two variables are included simultaneously in column 9. As argued by Erickson
and Vollrath (200X), the GINI index only captures inequality of land ownership among
landowners. The variable landholdings proxies the proportion of landless individuals.
Together these two variables therefore gives a more adequate picture of land inequality.
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18 observations leaving us with a serious lack of degrees of freedom. Still,
the damageshould be limited in that we do control for the poverty rate;
given GDP per capita this should provide some control for the distribution
of income.
In any case, the main point is that TRANS remains signicant (at 10%)
when we include the remaining 8 potential determinants of POLSTAB, and
a full set of regional dummies. Note in particular that TRANS remains
signicant when controlling for GDP per capita (LOG Y) and its growth
rate (GROWTH):We interpret this result as supporting the hypothesis that
market integration has a positive e¤ect on political stability above and be-
yond its (likely) indirect impact via prosperity.11 The exact same holds
true when T is proxied by REAL TRADE and COMM (columns 11 and
12). Both are robust (signicant at 5 % in fact) to the inclusion of all the
mentioned auxiliary determinants of POLSTAB.
Identication and 2SLS estimates In a recent contribution Olsson and
Hansson (2007) purpose that larger countries may be su¤ering, on average,
from low institutional quality. Briey, the logic of the theoretical argument is
that large countries have two things working against them. First, it is harder
to communicate rules and regulations of a society across a larger region.
This e¤ect is labelled the broadcasting e¤ect by Olsson and Hansson.
Second, larger countries may on average be more heavily endowed with
natural resources. Consequently the costs for the elite in enforcing property
rights may be higher on the margin in large countries, since an enforcement
of property rights limits the elites own ability to appropriate resource rents.
The authors go on to demonstrate a strong and robust negative association
between various measures of institutional quality (the rule of law index in
particular) and the size of a country.
By extension, in the present context we argue that low institutional
quality as it manifests itself in a poor enforcement of the rule of law tends
to limit domestic exchange of goods by elevating the costs of transacting.
11Recent work by Acemoglu et al (2007) document that income per se does not seem
to instigate changes in the political regime (dictatorship to democracy, or vice versa).
Instead, regime changes seem highly related to country specic xed e¤ects, which also
correlate with income. Our analysis suggests that such xed e¤ects could be capturing
the extent of domestic market integration.
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The argument can be summarized as follows:
Country size! Rule of Law! Intensity of domestic trade! Political stability.
Figure 1 illustrates these links using data for 136 countries. As can be
seen, larger countries seem to have lower scores for the rule of law index (in
1996), which in turn is associated with more modest trade intensity, and
lower political stability.
>Figure 1<
On the basis of these considerations we invoke country size as an in-
strument for T ; Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation (1) by
2SLS where log country size is used as an instrument for each of our three
proxies for domestic trade.
>Table 4<
Column 1 shows the impact from TRANS on POLSTAB, and the rst
stage association between country size and TRANS. As is clear, we have
strong identication (by the rule of thumbstandard: Staiger and Stock,
1997) and TRANS is highly signicant in explaining POLSTAB. Compar-
ing the 2SLS estimate to the OLS results reveals that the point estimate
of TRANS rises when instrumented. If there is a bidirectional link between
TRANS and POLSTAB our 2SLS estimate is consistent with the e¤ect run-
ning from TRANS to POLSTAB being relatively stronger than the e¤ect
running in the opposite direction. Another interpretation of the higher point
estimate is that the OLS regressions su¤er from misspecication bias. That
is, in the OLS regressions we might have omitted variables that are posi-
tively correlated with TRANS, but in their own right works so as to decrease
political stability.
The estimated impact from TRANS is substantial. To get a feel for the
size of the impact, suppose we were to increase TRANS by one standard
deviation. This would increase POLSTAB by roughly 1.1, or what amounts
to 1.3 standard deviations of the index in the sample; roughly the di¤erence
in political stability between Namibia and Finland.12
12Generating a 1 standard deviation increase in TRANS exogenously requires a re-
duction in country size of about 8 percent.
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Column 2 and 3 repeat the exercise, but where the alternative proxies for
domestic trade are instrumented by log area. In both cases we continue to
have a strong rst stage association between area and T. It is well known that
a countrys size is correlated with its external trade intensity (e.g. Frankel
and Romer, 1999). Hence, the strong rst stage association between area
and trade is perhaps not particularly surprising, and could be motivated
by other means than the above mentioned size-institutions-trade link. Still,
the rst stage results are consistent with our proposed mechanism as well.
The rst stage involving COMM is also noteworthy; larger countries tend
to su¤er from a less well developed communication infrastructure. This
could easily be a symptom of a weak institutional infrastructure, in keeping
with the basic logic of the instrumentation strategy. From the second stage
results it is clear that using either alternative measure of T lend support
the overall hypothesis that lower domestic trade intensity instigates lower
political stability.13 In sum, we view the above ndings as yielding strong
support for the hypothesis that increasing domestic trade intensity works so
as to increase political stability.
3 The Model
Consider a growing economy in the process of development. Time is discrete,
t = 0; 1; 2::: Imagine that at time t = 0, the initial population is distributed
randomly across some land area. Individuals live for two periods: youth and
old age. Their preferences are dened over two di¤erent goods. The two
goods will be labelled aand m, respectively. To x ideas one can think
of them as agricultural goods, and manufacturedgoods. The popula-
13As a nal check we proceed to test the exclusion restriction behind the 2SLS estimates.
This seems warranted for two reasons. First, if country size matters for the institutional
framework of the economy, it could conceivably matter to POLSTAB above and beyond
its e¤ect through our proxies for T. Second, POLSTAB could possibly matter to country
size. This would be the case if politically unstable countries tend to break up. If this
indeed is the case, our instrument is endogenous, which in turn would induce a correlation
between the second stage residuals and country size thus invalidating the IV strategy. The
latter e¤ect, however, seems unlikely to be important in practise. The reason is that if
politically unstable societies disintegrate (and has done so historically) we would expect
a positive correlation between POLSTAB and country size; in the data the correlation is
negative. Nevertheless, these concerns do merit a closer look at the exclusion restriction.
In the Appendix.we include an additional instrument and proceed to test it. Data does
not allow us to reject the exclusion restriction with respect to TRANS and COMP, while
it is rejected for REAL TRADE.
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tion can be divided into two distinct groups according to their comparative
advantages in production of these goods. Henceforth a-people and m-
people. The origin of these di¤erences are described below, but are related
to the process of transmitting knowledge from one generation to the next
and depends on geographical location. In every period, the groups interact
with the purpose of dividing a scarce resource between them.
The overall sequence of events in the model is the following:
1. The two groups choose what regime they prefer to be in: Conict
under self-su¢ ciency (SC), bargaining under self-su¢ ciency (SB), or
bargaining under market economy (M):
2. The groups divide up a common productive resource (R) between them
through either open conict or peaceful bargaining, depending on the
political regime chosen in the rst stage.
3. The two groups decide how much to produce and consume (and po-
tentially trade), using the allocation of R determined in the second
stage.
As usual, we assume rational and forward looking individuals who can
perfectly assess the e¤ects of choices in each stage. The model is solved
through backward induction. We therefore start below by solving for the
production and consumption decisions in the third stage.
3.1 Preferences
Each person lives for two periods; youth and adulthood. Individuals are
only economically active in the second period. In period one individuals are
being brought up, in the process of which they acquire human capital. In
addition they share consumption with their parent. At any given point in
time, there exist La adults living at a-locations, while Lm adults inhabit
m-locations. Accordingly L = La + Lm: Assume that once individuals
are settled in an area they remain immobile. More precisely, individuals in
a-locations are assumed not to attempt to move to m-locations and vice-
versa.14 For simplicity, we will also assume that population levels remain
constant throughout the analysis.
14Since location specic knowledge needs to be acquired when changing region, costs
of moving could be prohibitively high. In addition there would be the standard costs
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Individuals living at location  = a;m have the following utility func-
tion:15
U = U (a;m) = a

m

;  = m;a (2)
which depends on consumption of the two goods where exponents + = 1
indicates the relative utility of each good. The utility function satises
the usual assumptions of a positive but diminishing marginal utility of each
product. All individuals have x units of time at their disposal for productive
activities during adulthood. In a regime where individuals are self-su¢ cient
they will split their time between production of the two goods. Accordingly,
individuals are subject to a time constraint
x = xm + xa; (3)
where xi represents time allocated to the production of good i at location
:16
The total amount of available time for productive activities x depends
in turn on the type of interaction that is employed to divide the common
resource between the two locations:
x =

1
x
¯
< 1
in case of political bargaining
in case of violent conict
We assume for simplicity that the total available time is unity whereas the
time required for ghting is 1-x
¯
: This assumption is made to ensure that
conict has a cost in terms of forgone production. The conict option might
be thought of as a "Hobbesian state of nature" where groups are constantly
at war with each other.
3.2 Production
The production technologies are
m = Rhmx

m (4)
associated with transport etc. These costs would not necessarily be uniform across, say,
a-people, since the physical distance to a m-region could vary from one person to the next.
As a result, even if there were an incentive to move, the area need not be emptied.
15From now time subscript will be suppressed in the interest of brevity.
16 In a previous version, we also included the raising of children as a component of the
time budget and of the utility function.
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a = Rhax

a; (5)
respectively.
R is to be thought of as the amount of a resource that can be used
in both tasks, at a given location. As will be discussed further below,
Ra + Rm = R where R is the xed supply of the resource. Throughout
history, land has probably been the most important factor of production
and one which has also frequently been the object of distributive strug-
gles. Minerals and fuels are other examples of contestable resources. More
broadly, one might think of R as the productive resources that a govern-
ment controls such as contracts, concessions, protection, infrastructure, or
the like. Below the allocation of the resource between individuals at the
two locations will be determined by way of peaceful bargaining or through
open conict. Therefore, R associates the distributive struggle between
groups with their individual living conditions, and therefore links the polit-
ical struggle to aggregate productivity in a simple way.
The other factors of production are human capital (skills) h and time
x. We assume that output increases linearly with skills whereas there is
diminishing returns to working time since the output elasticities are ;  <
1.
A key assumption is that people in the two regions or locations have a
comparative advantage in producing one of the two goods. More specically,
we assume that
m = a > a = m (6)
In other words, at m-locations, the marginal productivity of an additional
working hour is larger in the m-activity than in the a-activity (m > m),
and conversely at a-locations (a > a). For simplicity, we assume that
there is a symmetry in these productivity di¤erences.
In order to ensure the emergence of comparative advantages in produc-
tion, we assume that output elasticities and the Cobb-Douglas utility para-
meters are dened by the following inequality:
a
a
>


>
m
m
(7)
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3.3 Human capital accumulation
Sector specic skills at the two locations hi accumulate through a process
of learning-by-doing in accordance with:
hit+1 = Axih

it; for i = a;m;  = a;m; hi0 given. (8)
The skills of the next generation specic to production of good i at loca-
tion ; depend on two factors: The knowledge of the parent, hi; the general
technological stage of development in society at large A, and the working
time in that sector xi: In this way, the intergenerational transmission of
skills is a kind of positive externality from ordinary production.  2 (0; 1)
means that there is diminishing returns to the human capital of the old
generation in the learning process.
The relative level of skills in producing the two goods, at location , is
given by
hat+1
hmt+1
=

Axa
Axm

hat
hmt

: (9)
In a steady-state where hat+1=hmt+1 = hat=hmt = ~ha=~hm, we will
have that
~ha
~hm
=

xa
xm
 1
1 
: (10)
where xi is the equilibrium time allocation to the specic production ac-
tivity, which will be determined next.
3.4 Optimization under self-su¢ ciency
As discussed above, there are two basic regimes for organizing production
in the aggregate economy: Self-su¢ ciency in which people at both locations
produce both goods in isolation from each other, and a market economy
when trade between locations takes place and production is specialized.
Under self-su¢ ciency, the utility maximization problem is to nd, for
both regions  = a;m,
xm = argmax
n
Rha (x  xm)
  
Rhmx

m
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The straightforward solutions for the time allocation problem are
xa =


 + 

x; xm =


 + 

x; for  = a;m
implying an indirect utility under self-su¢ ciency (with an index S ) of
V S  
hahmR for  = a;m: (11)
where 
 = ()
 ()


x
+
+
. It should be noted that
x will di¤er depending on whether the common resource R is divided up
through appropriative conict or through bargaining, as shown above.
The equilibrium levels of time allocation can now be used in order to
solve for the steady-state level of relative skills during self-su¢ ciency:
~ha
~hm
=



 1
1 
(12)
From (7), we can infer that ~haa=~hma > 1 > ~ham=~hmm, i.e. at the a-
location, the steady-state level of skills in the production of a-goods will be
higher than skills in producing m-goods, whereas the reverse will be true at
m-locations. If we further compare human capital levels within the same
activity across locations at some point in time, we can e.g. calculate the
state-state level for ~haa=~ham:
~haa
~ham
=

a
m
(m + m)
(a + a)
 1
1 
> 1 (13)
Analogously, it is easily shown that ~hmm=~hma > 1.17 Thus it is intuitively
clear that the potential benets of specialization and trade between loca-
tions will grow as a non-trading economy approaches its steady-state level
of human capital.
17A short proof of the result in (13): ~haa=~ham > 1 if a (m + a) > m (a + m),
where we exploit the fact that m = a and that a = m. After rearranging and
cancelling terms, this inequality is only valid if a > m holds, which we indeed know is
true by denition from (6).
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3.5 Optimization in a market economy
In this section attention will be restricted to the regime where trade takes
place, and where people specialize in production in accordance with their
comparative advantages. That is, as a result of the di¤erent paths of skill
formation described in the section above, individuals at m locations might
eventually nd it benecial to specialize in the production of m goods, while
individuals at a-sites specialize in production of a goods.
While preferences of individuals are the same as under self-su¢ ciency,
the budget constraints are di¤erent. For individuals at location  = m, total
income, ym, is divided between consumption of m- and a-goods:
ym = mm + pam; (14)
where p is the price of agricultural goods measured in terms of manufactured
goods. Income of m-people derive from spending the entire time endowment
on production of m-goods so that xmm = 1.18 This means that total income
is
ym = m = hmmRm: (15)
For people living in a locations the corresponding constraints are
ya = ma + paa
ya = pa = phaaRa:
Solving the utility maximization problem of individuals at the two locations
leads to the following demand equations for the two products:
m =
y
+ 
; a =
y
p (+ )
; for  = a;m: (16)
In a competitive equilibrium relative supply equals relative demand, and
the price adjusts so as to clear markets:
hmmRmLm
haaRaLa
=

+ [ymLm + yaLa]
1
p

+ [ymLm + yaLa]
18Recall that violent conict is not an option in this regime since we regard it as too
unlikely that people in the two regions would rst go to war over R and then trade
peacefully with each other.
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where yaLa is total income of individuals of the a-type, ymLm the income
of the m-people taken together.
After some rearrangements we get the equilibrium price
p =


hmmRmLm
haaRaLa
: (17)
The relative level of skills under specialization is hmm=haa = 1 since individ-
ual (a;m) spend her entire time endowment on the production of a-goods
and m-goods, respectively. This ensures that the equilibrium relative price
will remain constant over time. It also shows that the price for agricul-
tural goods produced by a-type people will increase with Rm since a higher
Rm means a corresponding lower level of Ra (since Rm = R   Ra) which
decreases the production of agricultural goods and increases the price.
Using (16) and (17), we can solve for the indirect levels of utility in the
market economy:
VMa =  (haaRa)
 (hmmRm)


Lm
La

(18)
VMm =  (haaRa)
 (hmmRm)


Lm
La
 
: (19)
From these expressions, it is immediately clear that the utility of people
in region  will be directly dependent on the human capital and resource
levels of their own region as well as on the corresponding levels of the other
region. This is the primary vehicle behind the emergence of a more cooper-
ative political process, as described below.
4 Political decisions
As mentioned above, the political struggletakes place in the second stage
over the allocation of the resource R = Ra + Rm. We assume that there
are three potential regimes for this political struggle: (i) An appropriative
conict under self-su¢ ciency, (ii) peaceful bargaining under self-su¢ ciency,
and (iii) peaceful bargaining under market exchange.
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4.1 Division of the resource under self-su¢ ciency
In the appropriative conict scenario, the two groups rst ght over the
common resource and then produce in isolation without trading, using the
time endowment x
¯
< 1 that is left after the battle. We assume that the
conict payo¤ depends on the amount of the resource R that is contestable.
Let us imagine that the two groups have non-contestable shares of the total
resource, aR and mR; that the other group can never conquer whereas the
remaining part, (1 a m)R; is up for grabs. With probability q, group a
wins the conict (and group m lose) which leaves a-people with a resource
endowment of (1  m)R (andm-people with an endowment of mR): In the
event of losing the conict, which occurs with a probability (1  q); group a
only keeps their non-contestable part aR and have to concede (1  a)R to
group m. This means that the expected levels of R in the conict scenario
are
E(Ra) = (a + q (1  a   m))R = R (20)
E(Rm) = (m + (1  q) (1  a   m))R = (1  )R
where  =  (a; m; q). When the conict has been resolved, the two groups
produce in isolation using the remaining time endowment x
¯
.19
The other process for dividing up the resource, which might be employed
during both self-su¢ ciency and market economy, is peaceful bargaining. We
assume for simplicity that this scenario can be described by the following
asymmetrical Nash bargaining problem:
max
Ra;Rm
N z = (V za )
 (V zm)
1  ; z = S;M (21)
In this expression, V z represents the indirect utility levels in regime z = S;M
for type  = a,m that were derived above and where  is the (exogenous)
relative bargaining power of the a-group:20
In general, this formalization should be regarded as a metaphor for some-
19The division of R during conict could have been modelled by using a contest success
function in the spirit of Grossman and Kim (1995) such that 1-x
¯
was endogenously deter-
mined and that the probability of conquest q depended on this level. See Olsson (2007)
for a model of this type.
20We recognize that  and  are probably interdependent. One might even suspect that
 () where 0 () > 0. Taking this into account does not a¤ect the results of the analysis
below to any appreciable extent.
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thing more general. The objective of any political player is (at least in part)
to obtain gains for his or her supporters. Sometimes political decisions rep-
resent Pareto improvements, but just as often it holds that one groups
gain is anothers loss. While gains and losses in general are not necessarily
symmetrical, the simple formalization of a Nash bargain over a scarce re-
source captures the avor of non-violent political struggle, the outcome of
which a¤ects the income and productivity of the citizens of society.
The two opposing political partieswill be (representatives from) the
two di¤erent groups living in society: a-types and m-types. In a regime
characterized by the absence of trade between groups we may think about
political groups being organized around locations. In a fully developed mar-
ket economy, location will also say something about occupation, due to the
process of skill formation and derived comparative advantages in produc-
tion, which is specic to individual locations. But the fundamental division
of the population into distinct political groups can be regarded as the same
across regimes, just as the decision making process itself.
The solution to the maximization problem above leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: The bargaining solution under self-su¢ ciency is Ra = R;
Rm = (1  )R.
Proof: The bargaining problem under self-su¢ ciency is to nd
Rm = argmaxN
S =
h

ah

aah

ma (R Rm)
i h

mh

amh

mmRm
i1 
where the terms inside the brackets (when multiplied by the bunch of
parameters 
) are the indirect utilities derived above. The usual steps
leads to the solution stated above.
Hence, the division of the resource will simply reect the relative polit-
ical power of the two groups. In the event one group were to become all
powerful, nothing rules out a solution where it takes most of the resource
for itself, leaving the other group to starvation. Hence, in this sense the
political struggle is non-cooperative, just like in the conict scenario above,
as the two individual fractions of society simply attempt to grab as large a
fraction of the resource as possible for their own benet.
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4.2 Division of the resource in the market economy
After substituting for the indirect utility levels of the two groups from (18)
and (19) into the Nash bargaining function, it follows that the bargaining
problem in a market economy becomes that of nding
Rm = argmaxN
M = 	(R Rm)Rm
where 	  1 haahmm

Lm
La
 
:
In the same manner as above, we obtain the following key result:
Proposition 2: The bargaining solution in the market economy is Ra =
R; Rm = R:
Proof: Straightforward di¤erentiation of the Nash product above yields
the results.
Hence, in the market regime the division of power ceases to be relevant
for the solution to the bargaining problem. In e¤ect, the result is equivalent
to choosing an allocation for R which maximizes the sum of the utility for the
two groups. In other words, the outcome from the bargaining process will be
unanimously agreed upon and Pareto optimal. The intuition for this result
is simple. The productivity of the two types become linked, via the market
mechanism. Seen from the perspective of, say, the a-type, the productivity of
the m type becomes important, since this determines the price a individuals
have to pay for manufactured goods. Likewise, individuals at m sites will
worry about the price of agricultural goods, and therefore, the productivity
of a-types. This state of a¤airs leads to the cooperative outcome of the
political process - i.e. capitalist cohesion - in the market regime.
5 Choice of regime
In this section, we reach nally the rst stage of the model: The decision
what regime to be in. In this decision, the agents take into account all the
results derived in the previous sections.
The direction of regime changes that we consider to be most relevant
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throughout history is:
Conict under self-su¢ ciency ! Bargaining under self-su¢ ciency !
! Bargaining in market economy
We argue that conict under self-su¢ ciency is a relevant initial condition
in our model, although we recognize that there are several examples in his-
tory of how economies have reversed from a market orientation (or "proto-
industrialization") even towards conict under self-su¢ ciency.21
For a transition to occur in the direction described above, both of our
groups need to be willing to switch.22 If one group negates, a shift will not
be realized and the economy will be stuck in a regime where individuals
rely on self-su¢ ciency. Since people are homogenous within groups, there
is no point in pursuing peaceful bargaining or trading unless both groups
participate.
Starting with the transition from conict to peaceful bargaining under
self-su¢ ciency, a comparison of indirect utilities for individuals of type a
can be made in the following manner:
V SBa
V SCa
=

1
x
¯
a+a
 

(22)
In this expression, V SBa is the indirect utility from bargaining and V
SC
a is the
indirect conict utility. The ratio in (22) must exceed unity for a transition
to occur. The di¤erences between these two regimes without trade have two
sources. Firstly, there is the obvious e¤ect that under bargaining, agents do
not need to devote a fraction 1 x
¯
of their time to ghting so that the full
amount of time (x = 1) can be used in production. The size of this e¤ect is
(1=x
¯
)a+a > 1:
The second e¤ect, appearing on the RHS of (22), comes from a compar-
ison of how big a fraction of the common resource R that a-people would
lay their hands on under bargaining or conict. We refer to this as the "rel-
ative bargaining power-ratio". The bargaining share is simply  whereas
21One such extended era of reversal was the period after roughly 400 AD when European
long distance trade declined following the fall of the Roman empire. A more developed
European market economy would not emerge again until around 1100.
22Reversals, on the other hand, only requires that one group wants to leave the current
regime.
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the conict share is  = (a + q (1  m   a)). Clearly, it will be the case
that a-people will be more inclined to choose bargaining if their bargaining
power  is high, if their non-contestable share of the resource a is low, if
m is high, and if their ghting strength q is low.
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The level of relative indirect utility is calculated in an analogous manner
for region m. It is noteworthy that it will always be the case that either
one of the groups will have a relative bargaining power-ratio that is higher
than unity and that the other one will have a ratio lower than unity. In
other words, one of the two regions will always get a smaller allocation of
R by bargaining. Whether the group that is relatively good at ghting
will still be willing to go for bargaining depends on the levels of the rst
e¤ect, in particular on the level of 1=x
¯
. The lower the level of x
¯
and the
higher the output elasticities +, the more costly will the conict option
be in terms of forgone production, and the more likely it is that even the
militarily powerful group will want to switch to bargaining. There is however
no dynamics involved here, which means that exogenous parameter changes
might push the economy towards either conict or bargaining where it will
remain until new exogenous changes occur.
In periods of peaceful bargaining under self-su¢ ciency, agents in the two
regions consider the option of starting to trade with each other.24 However,
a transition to a market economy is inevitably associated with transaction
costs. Goods need to be physically moved to the market place, a monetary
system of exchange might be necessary, and common standards need to be
agreed upon, to mention a few examples (North, 1991). The transaction
costs for setting up a common market also depends on geography, as em-
phasized by Gallup et al (1998). In a broader interpretation, one may think
of the transaction costs as also depending on how secure private property
rights are. If theft and expropriation of revenue is widespread this would
add to the transaction costs as some kind of protection against such occur-
rences would need to be bought by the market participant.25 To capture
23There is also a third e¤ect that human capital accumulation will be lower under con-
ict, but this e¤ect comes about with a one-period lag and does not a¤ect the instantaneous
utility comparison above.
24We consider it highly unlikely that regions in open conict with each other should
ever consider the option of starting to trade, although such a utility comparison could
certainly be made.
25Grossman and Kim (1995) model such defensive and o¤ensive expenditures ex-
plicitly. O¤ensive expenditures relate to costs associated with expropriating funds from
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costs such as these in a simple way it is assumed that households need to
pay a xed cost, C > 1, in the event they start trading.
The utility comparison that people in the a-region make is
VMa
V SBa
=   


hmm
hma
 Lm
La

(23)
where  = 

1 + aa
a 
1 + aa
a
> 0; whereas the equivalent
calculation of the net gain of entering a market economy for region m is
VMm
V SBm
=   
(1  )

haa
ham
 La
Lm

: (24)
Finally, in the presence of transaction costs C; we require that the fol-
lowing inequalities are fullled if a transition to a market economy is to
occur
a :
VMa
V SBa
> C; m :
VMm
V SBm
> C: (25)
The interpretation of these conditions is straightforward. Consider for
instance the m-type. First, a transition becomes more likely if haaham is large.
This ratio reects the gains from specialization in that it relates the pro-
ductivity of an m-type in producing a goods (ham), to the productivity of
the type that owns a comparative advantage in producing a goods (haa). As
knowledge of how to best produce a goods grows more rapidly at a-locations
than at m-locations, we showed above that haaham will rise over time towards
a steady-state level. Given that this level is large enough, the growing ratio
will eventually persuade m-people to participate in the market.
Second, consider the term involving La=Lm: In the present model the
ratio La=Lm is constant and dictated by the initial distribution of the pop-
ulation, since population levels are xed. Nevertheless, the individuals in
group m will nd the market economy more attractive if La is large relative
to Lm. This is a supply e¤ect. More a people" means a greater supply of
the a good (relative to the m good), thus implying a lower relative price of
the good that the m-type is purchasing in the market economy.
Third, the ratio = (1  ) represents a political e¤ect. In autarky, type a
other individuals. They show that under certain circumstances individuals will refrain
from investing in o¤ensive" measures, thus motivating scenarios where property rights
are secure.
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individualsbargaining power is . So the gains from shifting into the market
economy are higher the more powerful the other group is. Furthermore, we
may observe that the likelihood of a transition to a market economy increases
when  approaches 1/2, i.e. when initial political power is relatively equally
distributed. Should  approach 0 or 1, one of the groups will always object
to the transition and it will thus not occur.26
Finally, higher transaction costs C makes it less likely that any individual
will engage in trade.
The condition for the individuals of group a can be interpreted in a
similar manner. As goes for m-individuals, it is likely that individuals in
the a group will eventually support a transition to a market economy, and
start participating in trade, since hmm grows faster than hma. However, a
requirement for this to happen is that the steady-state levels ~hmm=~hma and
~haa=~ham are high enough.27
6 Discussion
Under the model the following evolution of an economy can be envisioned.
Initially, the population is randomly distributed across a geographical area,
after which an era of self-su¢ ciency commences. During this time the out-
come from political interaction between geographically divided groups in
society will be non-cooperative in nature, as groups try to grab as large a
proportion of the resources that they possibly can through either conict or
bargaining, to the limits of their political power and inuence. Slowly, how-
ever, due to task-specic learning, the gains from specialization rises. Even-
tually these gains are su¢ ciently large so as to entice even a very powerful
group to commence trade with their political opponents. As a result, eco-
nomic interdependence between groups arises via the price mechanism. This
change transforms the nature of the political struggle, since it is no longer
in the interest of a previously powerful group to provide its opponents with
less than their due shareof the economys resource. Lower productivity of
26See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) for a related discussion of how income inequality,
manifested in political inequality, a¤ects the likelihood of a transition to democracy.
27Formally, for m-types, we can deduce from (13), (24), and (25) that a transition
to a market economy will only evolve endogenously if
~haa
~ham
=

a
m
(m+m)
(a+a)
 1
1 
>
Lm
La

C(1 )


: If this condition is not met, perhaps because the gains from specialization
are not su¢ ciently large, the economy will be stuck in a non-trading regime.
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one group leads to higher prices of goods both groups consume. As a result,
the optimal choice for both political groups will be to reach a compromise,
the Pareto optimal allocation of the resource, which maximizes aggregate
output. Moreover, this allocation is unanimously agreed upon; a sense of
political cohesion has emerged. Hence, in the market regime, the outcome
from the political process becomes cooperative to behold, and moreover,
prosperity increases.
A transition to a market economy is only inevitable if the gains from
specialization increases to a su¢ cient extent. Even in this case, however,
the timing of a transition will be a¤ected by structural charactaristics of in-
dividual economies like transaction costs and the political division of power.
But once the economy has transited into a market regime, the political out-
come is Pareto optimal. Consequently output rises due to this fact alone,
but also because the market allows individuals to exploit comparative ad-
vantages. Hence there is a bi-directional link between a­ uence and political
cohesion.
At the same time it is worth stressing that, in the present theory, it is
possible to violate the association between income and cohesion, if di¤erent
countries are compared at a given point in time. To illustrate; consider two
di¤erent economies, where one is richer than the other. This di¤erence in
productive capabilities may not necessarily be trade induced. Indeed, one
economy could be relatively richer because of a larger supply of natural
resources (R). Since the market transitiondepends on the size of relative
levels of productivity across individuals, not absolute levels of the same, the
rich economy could be in a no-trade regime, while the poorer economy
of the two could be organized as a market economy with full specialization.
While this example perhaps is too contrived to be regarded as the likely
conguration of prosperity and tranquility it serves to highlight an important
point: Merely raising the income of an economy (say by infusing foreign
aid) will not lead to a more cohesive political climate unless this increase
of productivity is associated with a intensied exchange of goods between
citizens of society. This is consistent with the evidence presented in section
2.2.
Could there be a reversal from a capitalist market economy back to sulf-
su¢ ciency in our model, perhaps due to an exogenous shock? Since trading
requires a consent by both regions, a reversal to self-su¢ ciency happens if
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one of the regions opts out of the market economy. This is not a likely
scenario since specialization in our model will drive hma and ham to zero so
that people forget how to produce anything else than the good they have
specialized in. In this sense, people in the capitalist economy will have
"burned their bridges" back to a non-specialized structure of production.
In reality, of course, the sector without a comparative advantage usually
does not disintegrate completely in a market economy. Suppose that for
some reason ham; hma > 0 so that it is not completely impossible to return
to self-su¢ ciency. The expressions in (24) and (23) then suggest some shocks
that possibly could cause a collapse of the market economy. If, for instance,
the population ratio La=Lm fell - perhaps due to disease, mass starvation,
or emigration from the a-region - the price of a-goods would rise due to the
fall in supply. From (24), we see that if this change was large enough; then
m-people might be induced to switch back to self-su¢ ciency.
Finally, it is worth stressing that we do not claim that conicts never
happen in capitalist societies. In the terminology of Collier and Hoe­ er
(2004), conicts may arise due to "greed" as well as being a consequence of
"grievances" between groups. The latter motive may be highly persistent,
reecting perhaps religious and ethno-linguistic di¤erences. There is no
reason to expect that market integration would remove the risk of conict
if primarily caused by such societal divides. Indeed, fractionalization could
inhibit the development of markets, as noted in the introduction. We do
expect, however, that conicts spawned by the greed motive should become
less pervasive once extensive trading relations between citizens have been
established.
7 Concluding Remarks
The present paper has developed the hypothesis that economic interaction
between agents, the exchange of goods, is crucial for the nature of political
outcomes. In particular it describes a possible trajectory along which an
economy may travel in the course of development which eventually takes
it into a regime where political cohesion prevail. The implied link between
income and political cohesion is broadly consistent with both modern day
evidence on a­ uence and stability, as well as the historical record of current
day developed economies.
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The model is needles to say highly stylized. For example, it only allows
for two rival political groups. In principle the framework could be generalized
to the case of N groups (politically engaged in generalized Nash bargaining)
with individually specic comparative advantages. Potentially this would
allow for regimes involving partial specialization (some groups are trading,
others are not), thus capturing a more gradual process of market integration.
At the same time the model would become complex to the point of being
intractable, given the large set of viable economic equilibrium outcomes in
a worldinvolving trade in N goods.
The basic idea forwarded in the present paper could be applied to other
areas of interest. A line of inquiry where the logic of the model might ap-
ply is the sustainability of democracy. One might conjecture that in order
for democracy to persist certain amounts of political cohesion between ri-
val political parties is required. In the absence of a fully developed market
economy, democratic institutions may allow a majority to treat a minority
unfairly, leading the latter to nurse a grievance. Conversely, if political
fractions are economically integrated, political cohesion arises, leading to
policy choices with broad public support, thus making democratic institu-
tions relatively uncontroversial from the perspective of individual citizens of
society. While economic integration allows for higher income per capita, as
gains from specialization are exploited, the key driving force behind cohesion
is the interdependence of individuals via the market. Income does not mat-
ter per se, in contrast to the so-called modernization hypothesis(Lipset,
1959). Perhaps it was not a coincidence that democratic institutions spread
across Western Europe following the industrious revolution?
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A Overidentication
Testing for over identication requires us to add an instrument. A reason-
able candidate is the absolute latitude of a country (ABSLAT), which Hall
and Jones (1999) suggested as a potential instrument for the institutional
infrastructure of a country. More recently, Rodrik et al. (2004) have em-
ployed ABSLAT as instrument for the rule of law index, which we above
argued is related to the size of a country as well.
TABLE 5
Table 5 show the results. In all cases we get the expected rst stage
associations between ABSLAT and our proxies for T; countries further away
from the equator tend to have lower scores for our proxies of trade intensity.
The partial correlations are strong as can be seen from the signicance of
ABSLAT conditional on country size, and from the reported F-values.
Beyond this one may observe, however, that we are forced to reject the
exclusion restriction in the case involving REAL TRADE. In this case, the
2SLS estimates are therefore suspect. An interpretation of this rejection
is that REALTRADE may not capture domestic trade as well as our al-
ternative measures. This interpretation is supported by the fact that we
cannot reject the exclusion restriction in the remaining two cases: TRANS
and COMM. In the latter case we nd a 2. stage point estimate which is
virtually identical to the results reported in Table 4, whereas the estimate
for TRANS is somewhat higher, suggesting a certain amount of sensitivity
of the point estimate to sample size. Still, in both cases the e¤ect is well
identied within the modied samples, and the instrumentation strategy is
valid.
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APPENDIX 
Variable measures source Expected sign 
POLSTAB Political stability 
index. Average 1995-
2005 
Kaufman et al (2006)  
TRANS Log nominal money 
supply to nominal 
GDP, 1995 
World development 
indicators (2005) 
(+) 
REALTRADE Log imports and 
exports to PPP GDP 
World development 
indicators (2005) 
(+) 
COMM Log phone lines per 
1000 inhabitant 
World development 
indicators (2005) 
(+) 
ETHNIC Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
Alesina et al. (200X) (-) 
(Easterly/Levine 1997; 
Annett, 2001) 
LOGY PPP GDP per capita, 
1995 
World Development 
Indicators (2005) 
(+) 
(Annett, 2001) 
GROWTH Growth in GDP per 
capita 1990-95 
World Development 
Indicators (2005) 
(-) 
(Olson, 1963) 
NATURALR Ores and metal exports 
as a fraction of total 
exports 
World Development 
Indicators (2005) 
(-) 
 
SOCIALIST Takes on value 1 if 
socialist regime during 
the 1950-95 period. 
Sala-i-Martin et al 
(200X) 
(-) 
Annett (2001) 
URBAN Urbanisation rate, 
1995 
World Development 
Indicators (2005) 
(+) 
Annett (2001) 
GOV Government 
consumption to GDP, 
1995 
World Development 
Indicators (2005) 
(+) 
Annett (2001) 
HUMANCAP Primary school 
enrolment rate, 1995 
World Development 
Indicator (2005)s 
(+) 
(Annett, 2001; Alesina 
& Perotti, 1996) 
POVERTY Head count poverty 
rate, 1990-1995 
average 
World Development 
Indicators (2005) 
(-) 
Alesina & Perotti, 
1996 
GINI Land gini, average 
1960-90 
Erickson and Vollrath 
(2007) 
(-) 
Alesina & Perotti, 
1996 
LANDHOLDINGS Agricultural 
population per land 
holding 
Erickson and Vollrath 
(2007) 
(-) 
Alesina & Perotti, 
1996 
 
 
 
TABLES 
 
TABLE 1: CORRELATION MATRIX (N= 147) 
 TRANS REALTRADE REALTRADE POLSTAB 
TRANS 1    
REALTRADE 0.55 1   
COMM 0.55 0.65 1  
POLSTAB 0.47 0.63 0.62 1 
Notes. An outlier has been deleted for this illustration: Suriname. Detection tool: Hadi (1992, 1993)  
 
 
TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SELECTED VARIABLES 
Variable OBS MEAN STDEV MIN MAX 
TRANS 153 3.46 0.76 1.41 6.5 
REALTRADE 160 3.18 0.81 0.70 5.87 
COMM 203 4.08 1.85 -0.23 6.91 
POLSTAB 210 0.04 0.97 -2.60 1.50 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: PARTIAL CORRELATIONS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: POLSTAB 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
TRANS 0.40a 
(3.73) 
0.40a 
(3.61) 
0.69a 
(4.62) 
0.31c 
(1.67) 
0.35b 
(2.09) 
0.46a 
(4.75) 
0.57a 
(5.86) 
0.30b 
(2.34) 
1.39a 
(4.07) 
0.47c 
(1.88) 
  
REALTRADE           0.45 a 
(2.81) 
 
COMM            0.43b 
(2.15) 
ETHNIC -0.57b 
(2.17) 
-0.84a 
(2.96) 
-1.07a 
(3.02) 
-0.72c 
(1.83) 
-0.98a 
(3.24) 
-0.61b 
(2.30) 
-0.67b 
(2.38) 
-0.85b 
(2.04) 
-1.22c 
(1.99) 
-0.97c 
(1.72) 
-0.89c 
(1.89) 
-0.96 
(2.13) 
LOGY 0.33 a 
(3.64) 
        0.44b 
(2.03) 
0.28 
(1.31) 
0.16 
(0.61) 
GROWTH  0.04c 
(1.92) 
       -0.04 
(0.87) 
-0.00 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.15) 
NATURALR   0.00 
(1.43) 
      0.01 
(1.67) 
0.01 
(1.39) 
0.01c 
(1.88) 
SOCIALIST    -0.08 
(0.37) 
     -0.40 
(0.86) 
-0.25 
(0.64) 
-0.27 
(0.75) 
URBAN     0.01a 
(2.68) 
    -0.01 
(0.80) 
-.01 
(0.70) 
-0.01 
(0.84) 
GOV      0.04 a 
(4.58) 
   0.02 
(0.78) 
0.03 
(0.90) 
0.02 
(0.67) 
HUMANCAP       0.01 
(1.09) 
  -0.01 
(1.08) 
-0.01 
(0.57) 
0.01 
(1.04) 
POVERTY        0.00 
(0.06) 
 0.01 
(1.36) 
0.01 
(1.17) 
0.01 
(1.63) 
LAND GINI         -0.01 
(0.01) 
   
LANDHOLDING         0.06 
(1.68) 
   
REGIONS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.50 0.42 0.51 0.32 0.37 0.51 0.44 0.30 0.71 0.52 0.57 0.55 
OBS 140 143 98 120 145 141 141 78 34 54 56 56 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parenthesis (robust); a,b,c denotes significance at 1,5,10% respectively. 
The variables are: Index for political stability (POLSTAB) averaged 1995-2005, log money supply 
to GDP 1995 (TRANS), log exports plus imports to PPP GDP 1995 (REALTRADE), log 
phonelines per 1000 inhabitant 1995 (COMM), ethnic fractionalisation, log PPP GDP per capita 
1995, growth in GDP per capita 1990-95, ores and metals exports in total exports 1995 
(NATURALR), socialist regime 1950-95, the urbanisation rate in 1995, government consumption 
to GDP 1995, primary school enrolment in 1995, the 1 $ per day head count ratio average 1990-
1995, Land Gini coefficient and agricultural population per holding (latest observed during the 
1980-90 period).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: 2SLS REGRESSIONS 
SECOND STAGE: POLSTAB 
TRANS 1.35a 
(5.00) 
  
REALTRADE  0.88a 
(4.79) 
 
COMM.   1.00a 
(5.39) 
ETHNIC -0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.86 a 
(3.44) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
REGIONS YES YES YES 
FIRST STAGE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE TRANS REALTRADE COMM 
LOGAREA -0.10a 
(2.96) 
-0.13a 
(5.14) 
-0.14a 
(4.06) 
ETHNIC -0.40 
(1.09) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.89 b 
(2.31) 
F-VALUE 23.81 27.90 18.70 
ANDERSON-RUBIN  
(P-VALUE) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
OBS 147 154 177 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parenthesis (robust); a,b,c denotes significance at 1,5,10% respectively. 
The Anderson-Rubin test refers to the null of insignificance of the endogenous variable. The test is 
robust to heteroskedasticity and weak instrumentation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: 2SLS REGRESSIONS 
SECOND STAGE: POLSTAB 
TRANS 1.84a 
(7.07) 
  
REALTRADE  1.10a 
(6.10) 
 
COMM.   0.98 a 
(5.39) 
ETHNIC -0.48  
(1.28) 
-0.89a 
(2.94) 
0.07  
(0.20) 
REGIONS YES YES YES 
FIRST STAGE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE TRANS REALTRADE COMM 
LOGAREA -0.11 a 
(5.33) 
-0.13 a 
(5.14) 
-0.19a 
(4.06) 
ABSLAT 1.28b 
(2.49) 
1.24b 
(2.04) 
3.24a 
(3.45) 
ETHNIC -0.26 
(1.05) 
0.53c 
(1.75) 
-0.10 
(0.22) 
F-VALUE 18.85 23.64 0 16.19 
HANSEN J TEST 
 (P-VALUE) 
0.15 0.002 0.82 
ANDERSON-RUBIN  
(P-VALUE) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
OBS 121 127 138 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parenthesis (robust); a,b,c denotes significance at 1,5,10% respectively. 
The Anderson-Rubin test refers to the null of insignificance of the endogenous variable. The test is 
robust to heteroskedasticity and weak instrumentation. 
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Figure 1. Correlations between log country size (area), rule of law (1996), TRANS and POLSTAB: 
136 countries. Notes: For this illustration Suriname has been deleted. All depicted correlations are 
statistically significant at 5% or better. 
